Organized Crime Investigation, Strategy and Statutes
Introduction
Organized crimes have a long history, dating back to the antique periods of pre-scientific revolution. In the face of the global world, many crime syndicates have emerged, with some amassing immense power to manipulate and control the various justice and crime fighting agencies. Latin America has particularly been listed as a hot-spot for organized crime societies, with drug cartels being the primary focus. This paper proceeds to analyze the Medellín Cartel, and presents in detail the various kinds of law enforcement strategies, tools, and federal statutes that could be used to carry out effective investigation and prosecution of the group. While this group is considered to be presently extinct, its vast extra-judicial killings and crimes have made it the most popular crime syndicate in Columbia even after it was extradited.
Law Enforcement Strategies that could be used to Investigate Medellín Cartels
Basically, there are two most common law enforcement strategies that could be applicable to Medellín Cartel, which is a drug trafficking organized crime group: the reactive and proactive law enforcements (Abadinsky, 2010). The former is most applicable to crimes that involve identifiable victims, and where public participation is guaranteed. The latter, however, is most applicable in victimless crimes such as drugs, prostitution, and gambling. In the case of Medellín Cartel, therefore, the proactive law enforcement strategy would be plausible. This would involve officers or federal agents seeking the likely behavior or indications of criminal acts which would lead into the accumulation of substantial reasonable suspicion against the organization.
In order to carry out the investigation in the most efficient manner, law enforcement agents would have to conceal their identities, probably by operating as undercover agents. While this form of law enforcement and investigation has a myriad of risks, it is the most relevant to the aspect of drug trafficking, in which the Medellín Cartel was involved. The organization is reported to have come as a result of the amalgamation of various drug suppliers operating from Medellín city in Columbia. In the late 1970s, when the cocaine trade became apparent and started having a huge toll on various American states, many drug dealers joined the business, and cocaine export became the largest in Columbia, accounting for 30% of the total exports the country was making (Hylton, 2006). The members of the Medellín Cartel were majorly composed of cattle ranchers and wealthy businessmen who bought huge chunks of land and used them as grazing fields or as paramilitary training sites. These individuals wielded mush political power, and when they later came together to form the paramilitary organization known as “Death to Kidnappers”, MAS, it became stronger and more ferocious (Hylton, 2006). As an undercover agent, one would be able to access this information primarily by either being a member of the group, or acting as a business affiliate involved in transportation, sales, or abuse of the drugs.
Investigative tools
In order to get into the underworld of the Medellín Cartel, an investigation agency would have make use of various tools such as intelligence, regional information sharing systems (RISS), and electronic surveillance (Abadinsky, 2010). The intelligence tool would enable the agency to collect information about the crime syndicate, evaluate it, analyze, report, and disseminate the information gathered so as to enhance extensive coverage and knowledge about the organization. Basically, all criminal prosecutions would be based on the information gathered including organized crime whereabouts, crime dealings, structure, defense mechanisms, and business deals. Such information would be crucial in collecting evidence and reasonable suspicion that would propel the investigation agency to take further steps into the process. The two approaches to collecting intelligence data: tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence would both be applicable in the case of Medellín Cartel. Tactical intelligence would involve the collection of intelligence data with the aim of achieving a specific and immediate law enforcement objective, including arrest and prosecution. On the other hand, strategic intelligence includes the information that would be used in making long-term sound judgment such as achieving complete extradition of the organized crime. Based on these two approaches, it emerges that Medellín Cartel had been involved in a series of crimes and drug sales, amounting to well over $60 million per day (Knowles, 2010). In order to protect their personal and business interests, members of the group had been involved in terrorist acts against humanity including bombs, assassinations, and conspiracy killings of key political personalities. For instance, in May 1989, it exploded a car bomb that had been targeted at the elimination of Miguel Maza, leaving four people dead and about 37 others nursing injuries (Hylton, 2006). Investigations into bombings, assassinations, and other minor crimes committed by individual members of the organized crime could be carried out and used to make immediate arrests and prosecutions.
On the other hand, regional information sharing systems (RISS) is a platform that would also be very useful in conducting research about the organization. This is a joint intelligence sharing platform that was constituted and funded by the U.S. Department of Justice to help in curbing transnational organized crimes such as drug trafficking (Abadinsky, 2010). Since Medellín Cartel is an organization that operated within and outside the boundaries of the District of Columbia including Canada, the United States, Bolivia, Europe, and Honduras (Hylton, 2006). Sharing of information among these multinational state agencies would be crucial in completely annexing their deals.
Lastly, electronic surveillance is another investigative toll that would have proved very helpful in arresting and prosecuting the members of the Medellín Cartel. In the current system of criminal justice, various electronic devices operating with sophisticated technologies could be used to record, monitor, or tap correspondences and operations of the criminal group. For instance, using a telephone tap to record conversations that could lead to the indictment of these drug dealers could be used. Moreover, GPS and tracking systems incorporated within mobile devices such as phones, vehicles, and personal computers could be used to reveal the location of the organized crime (Dobrev & Webb, 2011). Other technologies would include telephone transmitters, lacer interceptors, fiber optics, satellite relays, and other components of predictive policing would be used to monitor the occurrences of crimes linked to the organization (Knowles, 2010). This would be practicable especially when an undercover agent was installed within the group.
Federal Statutes
In the investigation and prosecution of the Medellín Cartel, various federal statutes could be applied since the operations of organized crimes have been noted to violate a number of laws. In connection to the classes of crimes categorized under organized crimes, the federal government has put in place numerous statutes to address the rising cases of criminal acts within the United States, including: the Internal Revenue Code, the Hobbs Act, the Controlled Substances Act, the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute, the anti-money laundering provision of Title 18, and the statutes against conspiracy among others. In the case of Medellín Cartel, a couple of statutes would be applicable: the Controlled Substances statutes and the anti-money laundering provision of Title 18. The former provides that it is illegal to give or sell opium of its derivatives without a written permission from the Commissioner of Revenue. Later, as the realization of the gravity of drug abuse and trafficking emerged, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control was introduced. This Act is very crucial in the control of the use and sale of prohibited drugs, and could be effectively used against Medellín Cartel which largely dealt in the supply and sale of cocaine and opium. Inasmuch as the participation of the transnational agencies could help combat these crimes, the Act provides for indictment and prosecution without the evidence of interstate dealings (Knowles, 2010).
The anti-laundering statutes such as the Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994 could be used to suppress the transfer of huge sums of payment made between the cartel and its business associates (Abadinsky, 2010). Since drug traffickers like the Medellín Cartel transact huge amounts of money per day, the Act came in to limit and also monitor any suspicious transactions which could point to a criminal activity such as gambling or drug trafficking. With this statute in place, Medellín Cartel would be required to submit a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) so that its business deals could be evaluated and authenticated (p.379). To a great extent, this report could give valuable information for possible violation of the law, and which could be used to arrest and prosecute the syndicate. Apart from these two mentioned statutes, the organized crime, as has been mentioned, was involved in other terrorist acts such as bombings and assassinations, against which the federal government have instituted numerous statutes (Dobrev & Webb, 2011).
Conclusion
From the series of investigative tools, processes, statutes, and strategies, I feel that every organized crime investigation requires adequate and meticulous planning, strategic approach and patience. The investigation process itself could pose a lot of risks to the agent or officer, including possible elimination by the crime group. While other forms of crimes may require combative approaches, organized crimes such as the Medellín Cartel, which was ultimately extradited, calls for intelligence, collaboration, and astuteness.
References
Abadinsky, H (2010) Organized Crime (9th Ed.). Publisher: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning.
Dobrev, P. W., & Webb, C. M. (2011). Organized Crime, Gangs and Trafficking. New York: Nova Science Publishers.
Hylton, F., (2006). Evil Hour in Colombia. Verso. pp. 68–69. ISBN 978-1-84467-551-7.
Knowles, W. B. (2010). Organized Crime in the U.S. New York: Nova Science Publishers.
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